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ZANGE AND SORGE: MODELS OF 
“CONCERN” IN COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY 
OF RELIGION 
 
James Mark Shields 
 
Terms such as “concern” and “care” would appear, at first glance, far too 
vague to be fit objects of serious philosophical treatment. And yet—whether 
framed in terms of love, charity, or compassion—such concepts are central to 
virtually all major religious worldviews and thus call for treatment by 
philosophy of religion. Moreover, with the existentialist and 
phenomenological movements, twentieth-century Western thought has 
frequently turned its attention to matters that “bear our attention.” The 
concept of Sorge, as developed in Martin Heidegger’s (1889–1976) classic 
work, Being and Time (1927), is one prominent example of such. Variously 
rendered into English as “care,” “concern,” or “solicitude,” Sorge has been 
described as an existential-ontological state characterized by both “anxiety” 
about the future and the desire to “attend to” or “care for” the world, based on 
an awareness of temporality. In Heidegger’s terms, it is nothing less than the 
existential meaning of the Being of Dasein—i.e., of human existence itself 
(Heidegger, 1927, pp. 56–57; 1962, p. 83). And yet, for all its seeming 
significance, the concept of Sorge remains relatively underdeveloped in Being 
and Time and subsequent Western studies of Heidegger. At the same time, as 
I intend to show, the concept would come to play a significant role in the 
work of two important Japanese thinkers: Watusji Tetsurō (1889–1960) and 
Tanabe Hajime (1885-1962), each of whom would, in his own unique way, 
critically develop and nuance Heidegger’s concept (Heidegger, 1927, pp. 41, 
57; 1962, pp. 65, 83–84). 
 In what follows, I will analyze the concept of Sorge as developed and 
critiqued in the work of the above thinkers, with special attention given to the 
notion of care as both an ontological and ethical category and as a potential 
foundation for praxis. In addition to a theoretical analysis of these concepts, I 
will also touch upon the inescapable fact that each of these thinkers—in their 
own way—has been criticized for their role in supporting nationalist 
ideologies in early twentieth century Germany and Japan. In this regard, the 
materialist criticism of thinkers such as Tosaka Jun (1900–1945) will also be 
briefly discussed. 
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 For Heidegger, Sorge is manifested in choices made by individuals in 
response to the possibilities recognized in other human beings, based on the 
uniqueness of these beings. There is or perhaps should be an element of 
disruption in this recognition, since for Heidegger authentic existence can 
only be found in a break with conventional beliefs and assumptions—a break 
from what he called the They (das Man) or they-self. As is expressed 
throughout Being and Time, ordinary humanity finds itself in a situation of  
fallenness (Verfall) or alienation, though this should be interpreted in a 
dialectical rather than strict lapsarian sense. That is to say, fallenness is in fact 
a necessary condition for Dasein’s awakening to authenticity via Sorge—care 
or solicitude (Heidegger, 1927, pp.126–130; 1962, pp. 163–68). It is thus, in 
some sense, a form of existential felix culpa.  
 For those familiar with Buddhist thought, the non-temporal and 
transformational dialectic of Sorge bears resemblance to Mahāyāna tropes 
regarding the interplay or coalescence of ordinary, worldly-being (saṃsāra) 
and the state of awakening (nirvāṇa). This is especially evident in the 
following remark by Heidegger: “authentic existence is not something which 
floats above falling everdayness. Existentially, it is only a modified way in 
which such everydayness is seized upon” (see Steiner, 1989, pp. 97–98).  
Whereas Buddhists might prescribe meditation as the primary instrument with 
which to effect this “seizure,” for Heidegger it is Sorge that liberates us from 
what the tranquilizing busyness of ordinary existence or what he calls, using a 
familiar Buddhist terms in a non-Buddhist way: “the innocuous emptiness of 
a worldless occuring” (Heidegger, 1927, p. 179; 1962, p. 224). In short, while 
Sorge as solicitude might be conceived as a foundation for ethical activity in 
the world of other beings, it is, first and foremost, a recognition of and 
attunment towards Being itself. That is, it is a resolute openness to the 
transfigurative capacity of Being upon oneself and others. In this sense, Sorge 
seems reflective of the traditional Christian idea of radical conversion or 
metanoia in the face of God or the Ultimate. Think Paul on the road to 
Damascus. 
 In Japan, Heidegger’s concept of Sorge was first borrowed and critically 
developed by Watsuji Tetsurō (1889–1960), a philosopher who worked on the 
margins of the Kyoto School, Japan’s most significant twentieth-century 
philosophical movement. 
 In Ethics (Rinrigaku, 1937–1949), Watsuji argues that Heidegger’s 
Sorge remains overly reliant on the philosophical structures of Western 
individualism and subjectivism, and thus neglects the social dimension of 
human being (or the Mitsein of Dasein). Although Heidegger aptly moves us 
away from the Cartesian cogito ergo sum to an approach that might be 
summarized as tutela ergo sum (“I care, therefore I am”) the larger premise of 
subjectivity is not fundamentally challenged. In attempting to think Heidegger 
further, Watsuji contrasts Heidegger’s being-in-the-world (In-der-Welt-sein) 
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to the Japanese concepts yononaka and seken (“the public”) which signify not 
merely a spatiality of human relationships but also the temporality of such.  
 According to Watsuji, Heidegger erred in two distinct but related ways: 
(1) his ultimate commitment to the language and philosophical structures of 
individualism and consequent neglect of the social dimension of human being 
(or the Mitsein of Dasein) and (2) his privileging of time and the temporal 
over place and spatiality. Let us begin with the first point of criticism. Here 
Watsuji diverges from the standard poststructuralist criticism offered by 
Derrida and a few others, namely, that Heidegger was never able to free 
himself from the “logocentrism” of Western metaphysics, even as he 
managed to escape some of its other pitfalls. For Watsuji, it is not primarily in 
the pining for Being that Heidegger goes astray (this is a regrettable but 
understandable consequence of his rootedness in Western ontology or onto-
theology), but in the very framework of this thought, where, in 
Cartesian/Kantian (or perhaps Nietzschean/Kierkegaardian) fashion, the 
primary relationship is between the “individual’—Dasein—and the non-
human world (whether such is conceived as Nature, Being, or God). 
 Heidegger  understood being-in-the-world in terms of the practical (or 
“ready-to-hand”) use of “tools,” and thus, for all his claims to have 
overthrown traditional metaphysical subjectivism, grounded his analysis in 
inescapably subjectivist language. “[T]he spatiality inherent in “a being there” 
is, in the final analysis, attributed to the relationship of concern between I and 
tools and has nothing to do with the relationship of communication among 
human beings” (Watsuji, 1996, p. 174). 
 Though tropes of “being-with” (Mitsein) and “Care” or “Concern” 
(Sorge) occur quite often in the Heideggerian corpus, these themes, according 
to Watsuji, remain relatively underdeveloped, and do not easily connect with 
Heidegger’s more general thesis about Being and Time. This point requires 
some elaboration. Sorge—in which the whole structure of Dasein is 
understood, in its threefold nature as thrownness, fallenness, and possibility, 
to be “ahead of itself in already being in the world as being alongside what it 
encounters in the world”—is interpreted by Heidegger primarily if not solely 
in terms of temporality, by way of anxiety and being-towards-death (Watsuji, 
1996, p. 215). Thus Sorge ultimately lacks the sense of (embodied) 
compassion between human beings.  
 We should note that Watsuji neglects to mention that Heidegger does in 
fact deal with “place,” and in a quite novel way: in practical concern or Sorge, 
Heidegger argues, distance itself becomes degeometricized, and thus space 
becomes trans-spatial (for example, when speaking on the telephone, one’s 
interlocutor is “nearer” than the person in the next room, because she is part 
of one’s immediate “world”). Yet Watsuji is correct (and not the first to note) 
that this perspective, which would seem to open up the possibility of Care 
being manifest in terms of the space of neighborliness, is a path that 
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Heidegger deigns not to pursue. This may be because, in an obvious debt to 
Nietzsche (but also to Jaspers and perhaps even, somewhat ironically, to the 
Frankfurt School) Heidegger was intensely, almost obsessively wary of Mass 
Society or the Public—das Man. Dasein, after all, cannot be entirely an “I 
am” if it also has to be a “with-them.”  
 Thus a non-trivial tension arises between authentic being-with and 
inauthentic being-with-Them. It became clear to Heidegger that one of the 
lamentable symptoms of the modern age is precisely that “one’s own Dasein 
dissolves completely into the kind of being of ‘the Others’ . . .”—thus das 
Man emburdens authentic being-in-the-world. Though Care unifies Dasein, 
even Care must recognize the fallenness of man-as-They. For the Frankfurt 
thinkers and many existentialists, this situation of “alienation” requires 
nothing less than a (Kierkegaardian) leap into subjectivity, even if it is a leap 
without a sure foundation or goal.  
 But, again, Heidegger’s Care is not primarily an “ethical’ modality; his 
use of this term, as with so many others, rids it of its conventional meaning. 
For Heidegger, this divestiture or deconstruction is a necessary step towards 
rediscovering the true meaning of terms; for others (such as Pierre Bourdieu) 
it is an emptying out of meaning with deep and disastrous implications on the 
philosophical and political level.  
 For Watsuji, however, the problem of subjectivity in Heidegger is made 
worse by an over-emphasis on temporality, a temporality that “fails to 
materialize in the form of historicality”—which is the concrete temporality of 
persons-in-community (Watsuji, 1996, p. 221). One’s thrownness is a burden, 
and the sense of repentance—of coming to terms with one’s past—is not at all 
evident in the Heideggerian concept. In attempting to think Heidegger further, 
Watsuji contrasts Heidegger’s In-der-Welt-sein to the Japanese concepts 
yononaka and seken (“the public”) which signify not merely a spatiality of 
human relationships but also their temporality and historicity. Moreover, 
Watsuji raises the problem of the key philosophical term Sein or Being. 
Within Western philosophy, Being plays the role of the ground of existence 
and of logic: it is the “A is A” (Fichte) and the “direct, undetermined ‘to be’” 
(Hegel) (Watsuji, 1996, p. 19). However, the grandeur, plenitude, and 
objectivity of Being limit its applicability in terms of ethics. Western Being 
must be re-evaluated in terms more familiar and applicable to the Japanese 
situation, and to the condition of sociality more generally. Watsuji suggests 
that the Japanese term sonzai (son = maintenance or subsistence against loss 
[time] + zai = remaining within relationships [space]) is a more appropriate 
term for describing “the subjective, practical, and dynamic structure of human 
being” (ibid., p. 21).  
 Thus, though Heidegger goes beyond the “contemplative approach” to 
human existence, which reached an apogee in the “transcendental 
phenomenology” of his mentor Edmund Husserl, his remarks on “concernful 
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dealings,” while opening up spatiality as the structure of subjective existence, 
ultimately confines such to the relation of human beings and tools, and 
effectively bypasses interpersonal relationships. 
 Watsuji’s contemporary, Tanabe Hajime (1885–1962) of the Kyoto 
School, developed an alternative theory of “concern” in his reflections on 
zange, especially as found in his magnum opus, Philosophy as Metanoetics 
(Zange toshite no tetsugaku, 1948). For Tanabe, zange, translated as 
“metanoesis” or “metanoetics” involves the intense recollection of one’s past 
sins, combined with the wish that these sins had not been committed. In short, 
it is a radical transformation that is at one and the same time a form of 
repentance—though this repentence takes place at the level of one’s entire 
being. At first glance, Tanabe’s formulation seems both radically subjectivist 
and distinctly Christian. However, like Watsuji, he attempts to situate 
“concern” within the context of society via a process of what he calls 
“absolute mediation,” the previously restricted self “surrenders” to its own 
self-criticism, and is thereby liberated to the point where it can truly engage 
with other beings. Also, like Watsuji, Tanabe self-consciously incorporates 
models of thought borrowed from Asian intellectual traditions, including 
Buddhism—especially the Pure Land traditions.  
 In addition, Tanabe’s focus on the self-as-agent/agency (shutai) over the 
self-as-contemplative consciousness (shakun), reflects his Marxist 
sympathies, as well as his general desire to bring ethics and history into the 
heart of modern Japanese thought. A prominent conception in postwar 
Japanese Marxism was the (Sartrean) notion that the “abyss” of nothingness 
must underlie the freedom of the acting subject in the historical world (see 
Katsumi, 1947). Likewise, Tanabe’s “subject” is first and foremost an agent, a 
subject-in-action or in-relation-with-others. Thus Tanabe would concur with 
Watsuji’s comment that “[t]he study of ethics is the study . . .  of the subject 
as a practical, active connection” (jissenteki kōiteki renkan)” (Koschmann, 
1996, p. 103).  
 The key terms in Tanabe’s formulation that distinguish his own work 
from that of the other major Japanese thinkers are the logic of species, 
metanoesis, and absolute mediation. For the purposes of this paper, I shall 
speak only of the last two, which are the most important tropes in Philosophy 
as Metanoetics.  
 As previously noted, metanoesis or zange entails a radical tranformation 
or movement (the literal meaning of metanoia) linked to repentance. Crucial 
to Tanabe’s thesis is the fact that the meta of meta-noetics implies that such 
ultimately “surpasses the position of mere contemplation (noesis)” (Takeuchi, 
cited in Heisig, 1986, p. xlv). Yet what must also be noted is precisely the 
“after” aspect of meta-noesis, which is not meant to be anti-rational or 
irrational, that is, not an erasure or sublation of reason, logic, language, or 
criticism, but a way of pushing the critique of reason to its limits, a task, in 
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Tanabe’s eyes, begun but left incomplete by Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard, and 
Heidegger. In fact, Tanabe goes so far as to call his logic of metanoetics 
“absolute criticism.”  
 Absolute criticism is nothing less than the existential involvement of the 
subject involved in the critical task, such that, faced with the “crisis of its own 
dilemma,” the subject “surrenders” to its own self-criticism. This is not 
expressed by Tanabe in terms of the self’s dissolution, but rather as the 
“breaking-through (Durchbruch) of a self that hitherto had moved exclusively 
within the realms of discursive thinking and reflection” (Tanabe, 1986, p. 4). 
Moreover, this is the point at which “absolute mediation” becomes involved: 
the “truth” of the absolute can only “function” in its relative mediation with 
the world of forms and relative beings. “In this sense, the transformation 
through vertical mediation between the absolute and the self (Thou and I) 
must also be realized in horizontal social relationships between my self and 
other selves (I and Thou)” (ibid., p. lviii). In other words, absolute mediation 
takes the form of mediation through other beings; “the effect of the absolute 
on the relative only becomes real as the effect of the relative on the relative.” 
(ibid., p. 19, italics added). 
 Here we see an obvious parallel with Watsuji’s concept of aidagara or 
“betweenness” as the ground for ethics and human being, and also with 
Heidegger’s Sorge as a turn towards authenticity via an an openness or 
answerability towards Being, which allows us to break through inauthenticity. 
Yet Tanabe moves further than either Watsuji or Heidegger towards a 
grounding in historical reality. For Tanabe, nothingness does not or cannot 
appear in itself but only through the medium of historical being.  
 “What determines the individual is always species as an historical, 
relative particular form of being. It is not some absolute negativity of 
nothingness apart from the movement of this relative negativity” 
(Koschmann, 1996, p. 118). Absolute mediation takes place only through the 
irruption of absolute nothingness into relative being. Using more distinctly 
Buddhist terms: [b]eing here is “being as upāya,” [hōbentiki-sonzai] that is, 
being as a mediator of nothingness. Moreover, human existential self-
awareness, which realizes the compassion and altruism of the bodhisattva 
through the equality of mutual transformation, must be a mediation of 
nothingness in the sense of just such a transformation of subjectivity (Tanabe, 
1986, p. 109).   
 Thus, Tanabe concludes, zange—and only zange—is able to overcome, 
on the one hand, the problems of individualism that beset Western 
conceptions of freedom and, on the other, the lack of individual 
agency/ethics/this-worldliness of which Buddhism, and Zen in particular, is 
often (with some justification) accused.  
 In short, from the perspective of Japanese critics like Watsuji and 
Tanabe, Heidegger’s rejection of the metaphysical “forgetting of Being,” 
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necessitated a turn from “ontic” (ontisch) to “ontological’ (ontologische
) thinking. This move, while effectively subverting the Cartesian and Kantian
ego, also subverts the community of egos that make up the dominant Western 
conception of sociality. While this is, in some ways, a positive 
“deconstructive” move, Heidegger lacks the concepts or terms to allow for a 
rebirth of sociality out of emptiness or betweenness. In short, “man,” in 
becoming “the neighbor of Being,” loses touch with his neighbors who 
happen to be mere “beings.” For Watsuji, the result is not an overcoming of 
nihilism (which the Heideggerian project, in the wake of Nietzsche, claimed 
to be), but rather a nihilism in extremis.  
 As with many thinkers living and writing during the tumultuous decade 
leading up to the Second World War, the ideas of Heidegger, Watsuji and 
Tanabe have to be contextualized in light of the ideological currents and 
political realities of the 1930s and early 1940s. This critique extends to the 
connection between their ideas and the dominant (i.e., fascist or imperialist) 
ideologies of the day. The Case of Heidegger is well-known and need not be 
rehearsed here. During the 1930s and early 1940s, Watsuji felt compelled to 
concretize his philosophy in relation to the Imperial system of wartime Japan, 
effectively collapsing the tension between self and other into a merging of self 
with the “absolute totality” of the nation-family (see Odin,1992, p. 491; Dale, 
1986; Piovesana, 1969). It is perhaps more surprising that Tanabe, too, was 
drawn into this ideological web. Indeed, some of his statements during the 
early 1940s are, at least on face, more extreme than anything coming from 
Watsuji or Nishida Kitarō (1870–1945), the leading figure of the Kyoto 
School and Tanabe’s erstwhile mentor (see Ohnuki-Tierney, 2002, pp. 5, 
253).  
 This is a complex issue that I cannot fully address here, yet I find myself 
persuaded by critic Karatani Kōjin, who makes the case that Tanabe, Watsuji 
and Nishida all fell prey to what Karatani calls the lure of “aesthetics.” 
Karatani uses Marxist critic Tosaka Jun, a contemporary of Tanabe, Watsuji, 
and Nishida, to argue that these thinkers were beholden to a romantic tradition 
of thought that emerged out of a post-Kantian formulation of aesthetics as a 
vehicle for the surmounting or unification of contradictions, such as “those 
between the personal and the communal and between the individual and the 
totalistic” (Karatani, 2005, p. 109). In this sense, aesthetics gives birth to 
absolutism and, in effect, paves the way for fascism—in thought if not in 
practice. To my mind, the tragedy here is that Watsuji and Tanabe recognize 
in their respective formulations of aidagara and zange the necessity of an 
oscillation between self and other, individual, and society. That is to say, the 
tendency in much of their best philosophical work is towards moderation, not 
extremism. Tanabe, in particular, was critical of the Nishidan tendency 
towards abstraction and the neglect of historical realities, tendencies he 
summed up with the blanket term “culturalism” (Tanabe, 1986, pp. 261–262). 
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And yet, like many others, Tanabe was unwilling or unable to fully ground his 
ideas in terms of what Harry Harootunian calls “the world of everyday space” 
(Harootunian, 2009, pp. 84–85; also pp. 93–105). 
 
